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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RASCOFF’S
PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE
Philip Bobbitt∗
Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential Intelligence1 reflects both
the conceptual and research strengths of the author, which are formidable, and the practical difficulties of intelligence reform, which are no
less so. Rascoff is certainly right that to be effective — in the stillunfolding constitutional environment that must contend with terror
groups armed with unprecedented weapons and communications technology — the intelligence community (IC) must act within the law and
the rules governing that community must be reformed to make this
possible. He is inclined to believe that the answer lies in heightened
presidential management. I’m not so sure. The actual presidential
control over the vast intelligence apparatus is much more extensive
than Presidential Intelligence acknowledges,2 although it is so secreted
in the daily flow of tasking, decisionmaking,3 and after-action reporting that few outside a very limited number of White House offices can
actually know and appreciate its extent. I am very doubtful that the
mistakes attributed to the zeal of the IC were committed without direction from the most senior officials in the Bush and Obama Administrations. Moreover, Rascoff’s proposals to enhance presidential control may well be eclipsed by the recent announcements made by
Director John Brennan about the reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because Brennan’s proposals go to the real problem with the intelligence agencies of the United States.
That problem4 is not an insubordinate IC, but one less effective
than it might be, although I agree that organizational reform can make
an important, positive contribution. The CIA was created in 1947;
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School; Distinguished
Senior Lecturer, University of Texas Law School.
1 Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2016).
2 Professor Carrie Cordero’s piece in the Forum nicely captures the various executive initiatives that have prevailed since 9/11. She aptly concludes, “This is hardly a short list of presidential disengagement.” See Carrie Cordero, A Response to Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential
Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 104, 105 (2016). And of course there are many instruments of
presidential control that predate 9/11, such as the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, formerly
the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board.
3 The bureaucratic process of NSC oversight of sensitive collection by the intelligence agencies is accurately described in Stephen Slick’s essay, Comment on Presidential Intelligence, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 110, 113–14 (2016), at least as I have experienced that process.
4 I am aware that it is a commonplace error of critics who complain that the author has not
addressed the problems the critics insist are salient. Perhaps sometimes the commonplace, however, is not erroneous.
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President Harry Truman explained that its purpose was to prevent another Pearl Harbor.5 Nevertheless, despite many successes in the Cold
War, the U.S. intelligence community was unable to prevent the surprise attack on New York and Washington in 2001. Almost a year later, the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) concluding that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear
weapons program, among other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).6
A subsequent review by the Iraq Survey Group determined that this
assessment was inaccurate and premature.7 The NIE also claimed
that Iraq’s biological weapons capability had surpassed the arsenal it
had amassed before the first Gulf War and that Iraq had developed
mobile biological weapons labs.8 The NIE claimed that Iraq had obtained unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver biological weapons and that
it had resumed its production of chemical weapons and had accumulated stockpiles up to 500 metric tons.9 All these conclusions were
wrong.
The commissions convened to analyze the 9/11 and Iraqi WMD
failures found little in common. The 9/11 Commission Report faulted
the IC’s failure to share information within the community: “With
each agency holding one or two pieces of the puzzle, none could see
the whole picture.”10 There was a “failure [to] ‘connect[] the dots.’”11
The inattention, even uninterest, of the President regarding al Qaeda
before the attacks was, if anything, a contributing factor, something a
more intensive control of intelligence collection priorities by the White
House could only have made worse. The WMD Commission Report,
by contrast, found that rather than a failure to share information, it
was the general conformity of the analysts in different agencies, working from a few pieces of widely shared intelligence, that got the picture
wrong.12 These analysts had enthusiastically connected the dots, cre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5
6

See 2 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 56 (1956).
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 2002–16HC,
IRAQ’S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 5 (2002), http://
nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf [http://perma.cc/LBC6-XCW8].
7 CHARLES DUELFER, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE
DCI ON IRAQ’S WMD ch. 4 (2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq
_wmd_2004/chap4.html [https://perma.cc/6XBV-9636].
8 NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 6.
9 Id.
10 COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 171 (2005),
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS2F-8S2X] [hereinafter Iraq WMD
Report]; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 355 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [http://perma.cc
/4Z7F-3YXY].
11 Iraq WMD Report, supra note 10, at 171.
12 Id.
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ating a myth much as drawing lines connecting the constellations created images of a hunter, a bear, a bull, and a boastful if beautiful
queen that were in the end only stars. It seems that there was too
much presidential (and vice-presidential) guidance.
These two historic fiascos did share something, however: the fundamental structure of problem-solving within CIA and throughout the
IC.13 That structure is determined by the following dichotomies:
(1) the division between the public and private sectors; (2) the separation
between the domestic and the international; (3) the different rules we apply to law enforcement and intelligence operations; (4) the different reliance we place on secret as opposed to open sources (newspapers, articles,
and monographs, or interviews with their authors); (5) the distinction between intelligence collection and analysis; and finally, (6) the differing roles
of intelligence producer and intelligence consumer.14

And although these structuring distinctions enabled the U.S. intelligence services to successfully navigate the challenges posed by agencies
operating in secret in the Cold War, the disasters of 9/11 and Iraqi
WMD can be directly attributed to them.15
CIA Director Brennan’s reforms are an effort to overcome this
structure and the problems it imposes as the United States confronts a
new intelligence reality — a reality that is more diffuse, where the collection of human intelligence is more difficult, and where America’s
adversaries are more innovative.
The key reform is the creation of “mission centers” not linked to
any particular CIA directorate, each center being led by an assistant
director. Do not be misled by the fact that the mission centers, like the
directorates from which they draw personnel (and like their counterparts at State or Defense), are organized regionally and functionally.
The creation of these centers represents a profound change. Each center will have teams of analysts and operators working side-by-side who
are drawn from the directorates. Each center will have responsibility
for espionage, analysis, and covert action within its assigned mission
area. Indeed, it is most significant that the current National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) provides a precedent for these mission centers, because the changes in terrorism since al Qaeda emerged to declare war on the United States represent a threatening phenomenon
that is most challenging to those six structuring dichotomies: al Qaeda
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 I have similarly discussed these intelligence failures and Brennan’s proposed reforms in an
unpublished address to the Royal United Services Institute last year. Philip Bobbitt, Reshaping
the Modern Intelligence Community, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00
AM), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/reshaping-modern-intelligence-community [https://perma
.cc/8N8E-RMXN]. For an analysis of the underlying “antinomies” that give rise to these structural issues, see PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008).
14 BOBBITT, supra note 13, at 296–97.
15 See id. ch. 6 (chapter titled “Intelligence, Information and Knowledge”).
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outsources its activities, merging private and public spheres; it operates across borders, moving between the domestic and the international, unconfined by any particular state territory; it commits crimes to
further its political goals, and in fact depends upon criminal activity to
operate; it is difficult to penetrate but advertises itself relentlessly in
the media, including social media; it requires the closest collaboration
between producer and customer to confront it because the usual customers in the policymaking departments can’t be relied upon to ask
for briefings or task analysts in such novel and unpredictable circumstances; and its defeat cannot be achieved if analysts are unsure of the
sources of the information on which they rely and collectors are not
tightly confined to information that is actually useful to analysts, a requirement that is far from obvious when we move away from state-onstate collection.16
The most important objective of this reorganization, however, is
not simply to enhance collaboration by the colocation of analysts and
collectors and by organizing around missions and objectives, or even to
achieve a greater coherence than the structure we inherited from the
Cold War. Rather, that objective is to create accountability through
the assistant directors. At present, responsibility is diffused among the
directorates and there is no one person the CIA director can call on to
summarize future trends, current operations, and threats in any particular area outside counterterrorism and counterintelligence. The
head of the directorate for operations is responsible for collection but
not for the use to which the information that is collected is put; the director for intelligence is responsible for analysis but not for the reliability of the intelligence on which the analysis is based, and so on.17
The Snowden/Silicon Valley problems on which Rascoff focuses18
are grounded in objections to the IC’s collection practices. Subjecting
these practices — the sensitive “sources and methods” that are invoked
by the IC when it fears exposure — to greater scrutiny may well be
necessary to regain the legitimacy of the IC in the public’s eyes, but
such exposure is fraught with danger. As recently as October 10, 2015,
the Editorial Board of the New York Times wrote an article entitled
Why Is Money Still Flowing to ISIS?19 Apparently the editorial
board of the Times is innocent of the knowledge that it was the
Times’s own reporting — over the passionate objections of the White
House — that exposed the penetration of the SWIFT banking transfers system by the US which had been so important in identifying and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16
17
18
19

Id.
See Bobbitt, supra note 13.
Rascoff, supra note 1, at 659–69.
Editorial, Why Is Money Still Flowing to ISIS?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/why-is-money-still-flowing-to-isis.html.
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thwarting terrorist financing.20 To be fair, the Times’s public editor
later expressed regret over this.21 Perhaps someday, as part of a plea
bargain no doubt, Mr. Snowden can be brought to concede that whatever the benefits of his actions, some of those benefits have accrued to
the very organizations and states who are our adversaries.
There are executive agencies that deem themselves apart from
presidential control; in some respects the post-Watergate Department
of Justice has evolved in the direction of Vestal Virgins rather than in
response to the wishes of the incumbent in the White House. The ludicrous and embarrassing arrest of an Indian vice-consul in New
York22 is a recent consequence of this hermetic separation of information sharing and decision making from supervision and direction
by the President. But the IC is not at the top of this list, by a large
margin.
I hope that I am not totally insensitive to the public’s concern
about the chagrin and embarrassment a failed or faulty espionage operation can cause, though I imagine the news media is more acutely
sensitive to such matters than the public at large, perhaps in an excess
of schadenfreude toward a fellow institution engaged in not dissimilar
activities. The New York Times Rule — “never do anything you
wouldn’t want to see reported on the front page of the New York
Times” — is, as Slick points out,23 a perfectly awful guide to govern intelligence collection not only because it puts embarrassment ahead of
effectiveness but also because it would animate a self-censorship that
would disappoint even the investigative journalists who profess to be
most outraged on behalf of their readers by the conduct they relish in
exposing.
Before we adopt Rascoff’s proposed reforms, we had better satisfy
ourselves that (1) the description he gives of an IC insufficiently tethered to presidential oversight is accurate and (2) that the reforms he
proposes would not only address this lapse of control — if it exists —
but would make the work of the IC more effective by making it more
responsive to the needs of the President and the country. That is why
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html?pagewanted
=all. See Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2008) (reviewing ERIC
LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008)), https://
newrepublic.com/article/64747/secrecy-and-safety [https://perma.cc/V7BW-CYT5], for a withering
dismantling of the claims that this disclosure was not really so terribly damaging.
21 Byron Calame, Can “Magazines” of the Times Subsidize News Coverage?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
22, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/opinion/22pubed.html?pagewanted=all.
22 Annie Gowen, Arrest of Indian Diplomat in New York Sparks U.S.-India Tensions,
WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/arrest-of
-indian-diplom at-in-new- york-sp arks-us-india-te nsions/2013/12/17/09d1d 81e- 6714-11e 3- 997b
-9213b17dac97_story.html [https://perma.cc/4XZN-ZJY3].
23 Slick, supra note 3, at 116.
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I think the Brennan reforms are to be much preferred. Effectiveness
and oversight should not be opposing goals. When they are, the analysis and the prescriptions must be rethought.

